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Abstract:  
 
The paper challenges the theoretical and empirical orthodoxy surrounding the debate 
on international military intervention and mass atrocity endings, via an evidence-based 
analysis of the situation in East Timor in 1999. By combining existing but under-
explored data on mass atrocities with eyewitness accounts, new key informant 
interviews, and a detailed review of secondary sources, we demonstrate that the wave 
of militia-perpetrated violence in September 1999 was extinguished prior to the arrival 
of international military forces. We demonstrate the unique effect of national political 
factors, which, with the pressures of international diplomacy, combined to end mass 
atrocities in this particular case. We find that the Indonesian regime was not a 
uniformly recalcitrant regime opposed to ending the atrocities, and demonstrate how 
factors operating across the national and sub-national levels combined to force the 
Indonesian leadership to bring the militia perpetrators of this brutal episode of violence 
under control. Through our new empirical analysis, and the alternative explanation we 
present to explain endings of mass atrocities in this case, we challenge the tendency to 
focus on international military intervention as the means by which mass atrocities come 
to an end. 
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Ending Mass Atrocities: AǮǯ
International Military Intervention in East Timor 
 
Introduction 
The literature on how mass atrocities1 end has been dominated by the discussion of 
international military intervention. This debate centres on the moral, legal and strategic ǡǡǲȋȌǡ
are imagined as the most robust and efficacious response in the anti-atrocities Ǥǳ2However, amongst the multiple roles that international military involvement 
can play in those contexts affected by mass atrocities, for good and bad, one particular 
but important area remains poorly understood: The empirical relationship between 
international military intervention, decisions made by the regimes carrying out 
atrocities, and the actual endings to those atrocities has received limited attention.3 
All too often, states in which mass atrocities take place, and which may be held ǡ     Ǯǯ ǡ  invoke Wheeler and ǯ Ǥ           
regimes, between different factions and branches of the state, the outcomes of which can 
tip towards escalations of atrocities, or, indeed, their endings. These national and local 
sites of factional contest within perpetrating regimes, the dynamic processes of political 
change among state institutions during armed conflict, and the role of national leadership 
during mass atrocities, have each been critically under-examined in the international 
interventions literature. 
East Timor presents an ideal case for a closer examination of the relationship between 
international military intervention, national and sub-national political dynamics and 
endings to mass atrocities. In the run up to, and then following, the declaration of 
independence from Indonesia in 1999, East Timor experienced a dramatic episode of 
violence against civilians by state-sponsored militias. The international military 
intervention that followed is widely presented by the leading scholars as a model 
example of international success, in which the armed international coalition rapidly and 
directly ended the killing of civilians.4 However, despite the current scholarly consensus 
                                                          
1 tĞĚĞĨŝŶĞŵĂƐƐĂƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐĂƐƚŚĞ ? “ǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚĂŶĚƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĐŝǀŝůŝĂŶƐ ?ůĂƌŐĞůǇĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ
ďǇŬŝůůŝŶŐ ? ?ŝŶůŝŶe with the definition used by Conley-ŝůŬŝĐ ? “,ŽǁDĂƐƐƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐŶĚ ? ? ?
2 Ibid 
3 WĂƌŝƐ ? “ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?-572 
4 Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention; Wheeler & Dunne,  ?EĞǁ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? ?
tĞƌƚŚĞŝŵ ? “^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ,Ğůů ? 
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over this interpretation, the precise relationship between the intervention, and the 
timing and means by which these mass atrocities ended, has not yet been examined in 
empirical detail. Further, as a result of the dominance of the conventional explanation, 
the relevant decisions made at the national level have been considered only to the extent 
that they contributed to accepting international military intervention.  
Our paper contributes two key findings to the discussion of international military 
intervention and mass atrocity endings in East Timor. First, by considering the available 
empirical evidence, including a new descriptive statistical analysis, we find that the mass 
atrocities of September 1999 had largely ended prior to the arrival of international troops 
on the ground. Second, through analysis of decisions made within the Indonesian national 
leadership, we find that impacts of decisions at the national level explain the ending to 
atrocities observed in the statistical analysis. Whilst responsibility for the killings in East 
Timor lies absolutely with the Indonesian regime, we demonstrate that the Indonesian 
leadership was more conflicted over its approach to East Timor than has been assumed 
previously. We demonstrate how a decisive end to mass atrocities eventually became 
possible through the decisions of two relatively moderate leaders in the Indonesian 
regime. Their decision to impose martial law - a move discarded at the time as ineffective 
by the international community - was, we argue, a central factor in the control of those 
perpetrating the violence. We also introduce the wider question of why this imperative 
for action came about, and highlight the need for further primary research in this regard.  
Our reinterpretation of the ending to mass atrocities in East Timor has relevance not only 
for an improved understanding this case, but also for the wider study of endings to mass 
atrocities in the interventions literature. By unpacking the national context, we move the 
lens of analysis away from sole attention to the international dimension of military 
intervention, and towards the interaction between national and sub-national political 
decisions during a period of contested political change. In doing so, we find that the 
factors behind the sudden decline in mass atrocities in East Timor in September 1999 - 
just prior to the arrival of international forces - come into focus. It is, we argue, a 
combined set of political factors within and between the civilian and military dimensions 
of politics Ȃ and driven by international diplomatic and economic pressures - that made 
the difference. 
The literature on how mass atrocities end 
 
To clarify the contributions of our analysis, and to situate our argument in the wider 
literature, we discuss here three relevant areas. First, we consider the anti-atrocity 
interventionist literature, and in particular the tendency to treat perpetrating regimes as 
uniformly recalcitrant. Second, we consider the tendency to confine the examination of 
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internal state dynamics to the escalation of mass atrocities, rather than their contribution 
to endings. Finally, we situate our empirical analysis of the ending to mass atrocities in 
East Timor within an emergent body of comparative political research on endings, which 
focuses on the national dimensions of politics. This links to the turn within the 
peacebuilding literature towards examining the local and hybrid nature of peace during 
international interventions.5 
The bias towards examining the international military role in mass atrocity endings 
The major debates in the literature on international military - or humanitarian -
intervention regarding mass atrocities lie in questions around the normative, legal and 
strategic frameworks justifying such interventions.6 A related field of enquiry explores 
practical and operational realities, including the effects on the civilian population, and 
implications for surrounding countries.7 This literature is stratified by debates over the 
extent to which the unintended consequences of intervention, such as civilian deaths, or 
increased refugee flows, should limit its scope. But throughout this literature runs the 
common assumption that international military intervention necessarily has the capacity 
to end mass atrocities on the ground. 
Whilst wider questions around the humanitarian capacity of military forces are informed 
by a diversity of cases, the assumptions surrounding the efficacy of military intervention 
specifically in terminating mass atrocities persist principally on the basis of the endings 
to violence in Rwanda and in the Nazi Holocaust. In both of these cases the involvement 
of a foreign military force can be related directly to the termination of the atrocity. In the 
case of Rwanda, this also offers an example of missed opportunity for appropriate 
international military intervention.8Despite the highly atypical nature of the mass 
atrocity in both instances, the study of these cases has led to the dominance of a 
normative discourse which conceptualises endings with reference to international 
intervention Ȃ actual or imagined.9 
The strength of the normative discourse around the value of international military      ǯ      
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).10 Evans argues not only that intervention has the 
                                                          
5 MacGinty, International Peacebuilding; DĂĐ'ŝŶƚǇĂŶĚZŝĐŚŵŽŶĚ ? “dŚĞ>ŽĐĂůdƵƌŶ ? ?DĂĐ'ŝŶƚǇĂŶĚZŝĐŚŵŽŶĚ
 “ŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐŚǇďƌŝĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? 
6 WĂƌŝƐ ? “ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ? ? ? ?
7 DŽŽƌĞ ? “ĞĐŝĚŝŶŐ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?WĞŬƐĞŶ ?>ŽƵŶƐďĞƌǇ ? “ĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĞdĂƌŐĞƚ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?<ƵƉĞƌŵĂŶ ?
 “DŽĚĞů,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ?
8 ĞtĂĂůĞƚĂů ? “,ŽǁDĂƐƐƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐŶĚ ? 
9 Conley-Zilkic, ed., How Mass Atrocities End 
10 R2P 
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capacity to bring a termination to humanitarian crises, but that the debate surrounding 
the role of the international community should centre only on the manner and timing of 
some manner of intervention.11 This argument resonates with Sampford ǯ
three pillars of R2P which, even while placing the prevention of mass atrocities within 
the domain of the state, places the guarantee of these commitments firmly in the realm of 
international collective force.12 As then British Prime Minister Tony Blair put it, at the 
highpoint of post-Cold War internationalist and interventionist thinking in Western ǡǲȏȐǡǳǤ13 But such 
internationalist arguments obscure an important arena of action where atrocities 
actually end. 
The violence in East Timor in 1999 is frequently invoked to reinforce the dominant Ǯǯǡ
to killings of civilians take place. This position is best articulated by the influence of ǯǲǳ
behalf of Western actors.14 In developing this case, Wheeler and Dunne examine a set of 
economic and political factors arguǯ
military intervention. However, when they consider the overlapping international and 
national level factors influencing Jakarta, these are considered only with reference to the 
conditions under which consent for military intervention was obtained. This is mirrored  ǯ  ǡ        
military forces, nonetheless considers the national-international dynamic only insofar as 
it had anaffect  ǯ   ǡ      
civilian killings.15 ǯǯ
cases has influenced a number of discussions on humanitarian intervention and 
R2P.16Pattison, for example, uses the case of East Timor as an example of the effective use 
of military force in the development of a hybrid model of intervention.17 Elsewhere, 
Wertheim asserts that, along with Iraq in 1991, the case of intervention in East Timor  ǲ    ǳǤ18 Elizabeth and Perez also invoke the case in 
                                                          
11  Evans, The Responsibility to Protect, 7. 
12 Sampford, From the right to Persecute, 38. 
13 Blair, Doctrine of the International Community 
14  tŚĞĞůĞƌ ?ƵŶŶĞ ? “EĞǁ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? 
15 ŽƚƚŽŶ ? “ŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ'ƌĂŝŶ ? 
16 tŚĞĞůĞƌĂŶĚƵŶŶĞ ? “EĞǁ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? 
17 WĂƚƚŝƐŽŶ ? “,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? 
18 tĞƌƚŚĞŝŵ ? “^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ,Ğůů ? ? ? ? ?
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discussions over the role of state self-interest in intervention.19 As with Wheeler and 
Dunne, these works consider the dynamics between national and international factors 
only in terms of how they created the conditions under which the Indonesian government   ǡ    ǯ     
directly reducing violence on the ground.20 This body of analysis on the East Timor case 
has thus added to the general consensus over the capacity of military intervention to end 
mass atrocities.  
Given the consensus outlined above, what concerns us in this paper is to interrogate the 
assumptions made about the influence of international military intervention on endings, 
and to improve understanding of the national arena of political decision making. The 
latter is frequently overlooked in the interventionist literature, including in the East 
Timor case. We interrogate the actions and forces at play within the regime responsible 
for the killings. This is in order to unpack how and why an apparently recalcitrant regime, 
responsible for over two decades of mass violence, eventually acted to end atrocities 
prior to international intervention in September 1999.   
Moving focus from escalations to endings of mass atrocities  
The missing dimension we hope to shed light on here - the relationship between internal 
regime dynamics and mass atrocity endings - has been further precluded by another 
tendency within the interventionist literature. This is the tendency to confine the 
examination of internal state dynamics to the escalation of mass atrocities, rather than 
their contribution to endings. This is evident in two ways: 
First, as Bellamy, and Sampford and Thakur, describe, the question of national 
sovereignty within R2P is tied to the provision of an environment free of mass 
atrocities.21 Sovereignty, from this perspective, is sacrificed to external intervention in 
instances where the state is the perpetrator of mass atrocities. As the R2P doctrine is 
framed around the needs and actions of the international community, it is unsurprising 
that accounts of the termination of mass atrocities within this framework minimises the 
role of the national state. Our attention, here, to the role of the national state, and its 
constraints and actions during periods of regime change, aims to address these 
limitations within the R2P-framed literature.  
Second, in the dominant R2P literature, mass atrocities are linked to chaotic transitional 
contexts, where the state is presumed to be in crisis. While elements of this assumption 
                                                          
19 ůŝǌĂďĞƚŚĂŶĚWĞƌĞǌ ? “ĞǇŽŶĚ'ŽŽĚ/ŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
20 tŚĞĞůĞƌĂŶĚƵŶŶĞ ? “EĞǁ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? 
21 ĞůůĂŵǇ ? “ZĞĂůŝǌŝŶŐƚŚĞZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽWƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ?^ĂŵƉĨŽƌĚ ?dŚĂŬƵƌ ?From the right to Persecute 
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might be true, the wider literature on mass atrocities shows that such acts can form part 
of a strategic goal of the perpetrating state, rather than being a chaotic side effect.22 But 
even in those cases, the strategic goals of violence can be overstated Ȃ as if, without 
external intervention, rogue states or state elements will never be persuaded to act 
otherwise, due to their own violent internal logic. The situation is usually more nuanced 
and more complicated: those states conducting or condoning mass atrocities may be in a 
leadership crisis, may have elements of the state acting beyond orders, and/or may be 
following a strategic logic, all at the same time. There may be chaos and strategy wrapped 
up in the same mass atrocity. 
We find that the main literature on endings to mass atrocities, framed around the R2P 
perspective, has taken such a predominantly international focus that it does not 
sufficiently unpack two crucial issues. These are, first, the internal politics of how 
perpetrating states and their leaders operate during periods of highly contested (rather 
than unopposed) armed conflict;23 and, second, why mass atrocities in such contexts rise 
and fall in response to leadership contests over controlling the state. The dominant ǯ           
atrocities, means that potentially important elite contests and political dynamics at the 
national and sub-national levels have not been adequately accounted. Recent 
comparative cross-country research, within which we situate our paper, has begun to 
address this bias with a new framework for analysing mass atrocity endings.  
The new body of comparative mass atrocity ending research 
Within the new body of comparative mass atrocity ending research, several authors have 
identified that national political agendas have a significant effect on local decisions 
around mass atrocity endings, including in response to international agendas.24 This body 
of work builds on analyses of the causes of genocide by Straus, Valentino and Wood et al, 
which variously attend to the nature of regimes and national politics during genocide.25 
The new arena of work on mass atrocity endings, which we build on, specifically unpacks 
the interaction between national and local dynamics of mass atrocities, as well as how 
national regimes respond to influences from the international arena, when and where 
relevant to endings. This new research focus within the study of mass atrocities finds that 
the role of international intervention - where it has been relevant - is usually secondary 
to, or, at least, indirectly linked to, the more significant influence of national and local 
                                                          
22 ŽǁŶĞƐ ? “ĞƐƉĞƌĂƚĞdŝŵĞƐ ? ?tŽŽĚĞƚĂů ? “ƌŵĞĚ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? 
23 ^ĞĞ^ŵŝƚŚ ? “/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ? ?ŽŶŚŽǁƚŚĞ/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂŶƌĞŐŝŵĞĂĐƚĞĚǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇĚƵƌŝŶŐƉĞƌŝŽĚƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞ
international community did not contest armed conflicts that directly affected civilians 
24 Conley-Zilkic, How Mass Atrocities End 
25Strauss, Making and Unmaking Nations; Valentino, Final Solutions; tŽŽĚĞƚĂů ? “ƌŵĞĚ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?
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factors on those endings.26 
The new body of cross-country comparative work on mass atrocity endings is in parallel 
with, although not directly related to, the now large body of critical work on the local or 
hybrid nature of peacebuilding, lead by MacGinty and Richmond.27  Ǯ ǯ 
peacebuilding analysis focuses on the post-conflict period, following the intervention of 
the international community in many cases, and explicitly considers the national and sub-
national interactions between the activities of international peacebuilding organisations 
and actors, and those at the national and local level. Whilst our focus here is on the period 
prior to international intervention, rather than after its cessation, insights drawn from 
the local turn in peacebuilding scholarship, especially on the critical role of local actors in ǮǯǡǤ 
Our paper makes a new contribution to the empirical analysis of mass atrocity endings 
by taking this multi-layered mode of analysis to the East Timor case. While we recognise 
the undoubted effect the threat of credible international military intervention had on ǯ      ǡ      
dynamics of national and sub-national elements within the regime, as international 
pressure mounted. It was the national decision to end the Indonesian military action 
causing mass atrocities in East Timor that must interest us here, as atrocities ended prior 
to international boots landing on the ground. To reach this conclusion we consider a 
range of empirical data on the rise and fall of mass atrocities in East Timor, and generate 
new insights. We then consider the interaction between different elements of the 
Indonesian regime, and the escalation and de-escalation of atrocities, as political 
dynamics dramatically shifted through 1999.  
The analytic shift that we make, from the international to the national, while simple, is 
nonetheless important because our data shows that mass atrocity trajectories in East 
Timor had largely terminated prior to international military intervention. In taking a 
more contextualised, nationally focused, and multi-layered analysis of the endings to 
mass atrocities in East Timor, in the context of the build up to international intervention, 
we therefore make a new empirical contribution to the literature aimed at understanding 
this important case. We also provide a new set of insights to the wider study of mass 
atrocity endings, by shifting analytical focus from consent (of the regime) to accepting 
international forces, onto the impact of decisions in the regime leadership on mass 
                                                          
26 Conley-Zilkic, How Mass Atrocities End ?ĞtĂĂůĞƚĂů ? “,ŽǁDĂƐƐƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐŶĚ ? ?WĂƌŝƐ ? “ZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
WƌŽƚĞĐƚ ? ?^ŵŝƚŚ ? “/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ? 
27 MacGinty, International Peacebuilding; DĂĐ'ŝŶƚǇĂŶĚZŝĐŚŵŽŶĚ ? “dŚĞůŽĐĂůƚƵƌŶŝŶƉĞĂĐĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ? ?
DĂĐ'ŝŶƚǇĂŶĚZŝĐŚŵŽŶĚ “dŚĞĨĂůůĂĐǇŽĨĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐŚǇďƌŝĚƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? 
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atrocity endings on the ground. We hope that both these actions will add to developing a 
more nuanced theory of mass atrocity endings.  
Mass atrocity trajectories in East Timor during the Indonesian transition 
In this section we present a mixed methods analysis of the trajectory of mass atrocities 
in East Timor. Within this, we combine the results of descriptive quantitative analysis of 
the extent of civilian killings with eyewitness accounts to analyse the ending to mass 
atrocities in relation to the international intervention. These eyewitness accounts include 
both the set of existing published accounts on the violence, and new qualitative data 
gathered through interviews and documentary footage. Through the combination of 
these data, we demonstrate that, contrary to the dominant narrative on this case, the key 
period of de-escalation occurred prior to the arrival of international forces. Following 
from the theoretical discussions above, we then turn to unpacking decisions at the 
national level to consider how the ending to mass violence was brought about.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Across the many examples of mass atrocities globally, the case of East Timor presents one 
of few opportunities for the mixed-methods analysis of endings in the manner to follow. 
This is due to the existence of a dataset of human rights violations collected by the 
Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) - one of very few examples 
of such datasets globally. This dataset facilitates descriptive analysis of trends in the level 
of civilian killing over time, in a manner not possible with eyewitness accounts alone. We 
have, however, selected a mixed methods analysis over a purely quantitative approach. 
This reflects the limitations inherent in quantitative datasets of civilian killings which, as 
discussed with reference to the outcomes of our analysis, includes the impact of errors in 
recollection, victim fear and reporting biases. The triangulation of data between sources 
therefore serves to minimise the scope for error, in a context in which sources are 
necessarily contested and partial.  
 
Our analysis of the testimonies and other data provided to the CAVR has been undertaken 
using two datasets - the Human Rights Violations Database (HRVD) and the raw testimony 
evidence28. The HRVD was constructed on behalf of the Commission, and presents basic 
information on reported human rights violations between 1975 and 1999. The detail 
within the HRVD is limited by an anonymisation process, which is restricted to the month 
and district in which each killing took place. The HRVD is thus useful for the analysis of 
the distribution of killings between 1974 and 1999 as a whole, but has limited 
                                                          
28 ^ĞĞ^ŝůǀĂ ?Ăůů ? “,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐsŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? 
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applicability to the analysis of the 1999 intervention alone.  
 
To analyse the levels of killings within the immediate pre and post intervention periods, 
we used the raw testimony evidence dataset. This dataset has been constructed 
specifically for the purposes of this analysis through extracting information on civilian 
killings from the final report of the CAVR. In constructing this dataset, we cross-
referenced estimates of civilian deaths within major concentrations of mass killing with 
two other investigations into the scope of the killing29 - favouring minimum estimates in 
all cases. Outside of those noted events, the small number of testimonies which do not 
include a precise date and number of deaths were excluded from the dataset to minimise 
potential sources of inaccuracy.  
 
Patterns of Civilian Killings 
 
Turning to the overall profile of killings shown in Figure 1, the spike in the level of killings 
in 1999 shown in Figure 1 attests to the exceptional nature of the violence that year, 
compared with recent Timorese history. Figure 2 confirms that this episode of mass 
killing was concentrated in the aftermath of the UN-supervised Popular Consultation in 
September, rather than as part of an escalation throughout 1999. The conventional 
account of the violence follows that, immediately after the announcement of the result on 
the 4th September, widespread killings were perpetrated by militias armed by ABRI, often 
under the observation of ABRI30 and police31 personnel. The killings targeted alleged 
independence supporters32, those who fled to refugee camps in West Timor33, and the 
wider civilian population34.  The ending to this episode of mass killings is then typically 
been ascribed to the arrival of Australian troops on the 20th September, as part of the 
International Force for East Timor (INTERFET).  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
By breaking down reported killings on a day-by-day basis through September 1999, we 
are able to examine more closely the impact of the arrival of international forces. As 
                                                          
29 Dunn, Crimes Against Humanity; ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “Ăst Timor 1999 ? 
30 CAVR, Chega!, 488 
31 Ibid 
32 Dunn, Crimes Against Humanity, 28. 
33 ĐŚŵĂĚ ? “ĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌĞƐĞZĞĨƵŐĞĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?
34 ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “ĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?sZ ?Chega!,300; Dunn, Crimes Against Humanity, 28 
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shown in Figure 3, recorded civilian killings were at their greatest between the 5th and 
11th of September, and had declined substantially by the arrival of INTERFET on the 20th 
September. Indeed, considering the moving mean of civilian killings shown in Figure 4, 
the average number of daily civilian killings had declined to a level similar to that of the 
pre-referendum result period by the date of INTERFET deployment. The data therefore 
indicate that factors other than the arrival of INTERFET troops in Dili were responsible 
for the rapid decline in the levels of killings observed.  
 
[Figure 3] 
[Figure 4] 
 
This finding that the level of killings in September 1999 had declined substantially before 
the arrival of INTERFET is a significant departure from the general treatment of this case, 
as discussed previously. Given the extent of this departure, we consider and dismiss two 
alternate explanations for the trend observed in the data. First, it is possible that the 
number of unknown dates within the testimony evidence presented in the final report of 
the CAVR - given in Table 1 below - could distort the pattern of killings observed. Second, 
it is possible that issues with testimony evidence, particularly errors in recollection and 
survivorship amongst witnesses, have produced a skewed impression of the distribution 
of killings within this period.  
 
Addressing these points in turn, there is no reason to suspect that a disproportionate 
quantity of those killings for which the precise date is unknown fall between the 11th and 
20th of September. Indeed, as shown in Table 1, of those 25 killings for which a precise 
date is unknown but a range of dates is provided, only 6 have the potential to have fallen 
within this period. Nothing further can be added on the 20 killings for which the date is 
entirely unknown, but confidence is gained from the fact that even if all of these fell within 
the highlighted period, the decrease in the level of violence from its peak prior to the 
arrival of INTERFET would still be evident. Second, whilst concerns over the validity of 
testimony evidence in analysing patterns of civilian killings are legitimate, the small time 
period being studied means that there is no foreseeable variation in these factors which 
would explain the observed trend.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Corroborating Evidence 
 
The evidence available from the CAVR indicates that the level of civilian killings in East 
Timor had substantially declined prior to the arrival of INTERFET.  To further corroborate 
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this, we conducted a review of the accounts produced by journalists, UN staff and other 
witnesses to the violence.  
 
It is consistent across eye-witness accounts that militia-perpetrated violence began 
within hours of the independence result of September 4th.35 Two days later, Carter Centre 
observers36 describe not only the complete control of militias over Dili, but the massive 
scope of the destruction which had been unleashed37. Satellite imagery captured on the 
8th September confirms the intensity of destruction within this early period,38 with 
members of the UNSC delegation describing that mass looting and destruction had been 
unleashed in Dili by the 11th September39. Outside Dili, militia violence and pressure from 
ABRI forced UNAMET District staff to retreat to their central compound on the 8th40, and 
to evacuate entirely by the 14th. As such, the next point at which detailed information is 
provided from external or international sources comes with the arrival of INTERFET on 
the 20th. Our examination of archived documentary footage Ȃ which was locally recorded 
between the 15th and 18th September 1999 - showed images from Dili, with burning 
buildings, and sheltering civilians, with limited evidence of ongoing direct attacks on 
civilians by ABRI or militia during this period. 
 
The situation in Dili when international troops arrived on the 20th has thus been 
described as one of almost complete destruction and displacement. However, multiple 
accounts of the deployment of INTERFET indicate that international troops faced little 
armed opposition on arrival in East Timor, as follows: 
 
Following an uncontested deployment via Hercules C-130 - selected over the combat-
capable Black Hawk helicopter41 - the initially tense exchanges between INTERFET and 
ABRI personnel did not result in outright combat. Indeed, there is no indication of shots 
being exchanged with ABRI in Dili as INTERFET troops established control over what ǯ42, nor as troops moved into the suburbs of Dili43. On the 
role of the militia, whilst aggressive encounters occurred as INTERFET and ABRI 
personnel shared security duties over Dili port, displays and threats did not result in 
                                                          
35 Greenlees & Garran, Deliverance, 198 
36 Carter Centre, Postelection Statement 
37 Carter Centre, 1999 Public Consultation 
38 Schimmer, Violence by Fire 
39 UNSC, Security Council Mission, 5 
40 Cristalis, East Timor, 229 
41Breen, Mission Accomplished, 28 
42 Ibid, 35 
43 The incident in Becora was amongst the most tĞŶƐĞ ?ďƵƚǁĂƐ “ƌĞƐŽůǀĞĚĂĨƚĞƌĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?<ŝŶŐƐďƵƌǇ ?East Timor, 75 
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combat.44 These accounts are corroborated by filmed interviews in Dili with Australian 
troops, which confirmed a lack of outward threats or combat exchanges between 
INTERFET and ABRI in the city. When questioned on the threat from ABRI, Australian 
soldiers are filmed ǡǲȏȐǯǥǯǤǳ45 
 
The first exchange of fire between INTERFET and the militia documented in the accounts 
available is reported to have occurred on the 6th October - over two weeks after the 
international deployment. The incident, an ambush in Suai as INTERFET sought to clear 
routes from Dili, resulted in the deaths of four militia and injuries to two Australian 
troops.46 What Kilcullen describes as the largest clash between INTERFET and ABRI 
occurred five days later in the border village of Motaain, which was acknowledged by 
both sides as resulting from mutual confusion over the border with Indonesian West 
Timor.47 These events were, however, the exception to the general pattern of expansion 
of INTERFET to the border area, which saw troops arriving to communities from which 
ABRI and the militia had already retreated. Hence, whilst some encounters with 
retreating Indonesian troops and militias required skilful management by INTERFET, 
their expansion was largely unopposed.48 
 
These qualitative accounts thus corroborate the finding of the quantitative analysis: the 
reduction in the level of civilian killings in mid to late September 1999 preceded the 
arrival of international troops. The accounts available do not document instances of 
troops intervening in ongoing atrocities against civilians, there was no documented 
incidents of armed resistance provided by the Indonesian forces as international forces 
spread their control across East Timor, and the militia appear to have largely withdrawn 
along with TNI, ahead of INTERFET expansion.  
The national dimension to the ending of mass atrocities 
Now we have demonstrated that the mass killing of civilians in East Timor ended prior to 
the arrival of international troops, here we present our alternative thesis on why this 
happened, focusing on decisions made at the national political level, which had an impact 
on the local level. This is not to dismiss the role of international diplomacy entirely, a 
point to which the conclusions of these discussion returns, but rather to highlight the 
                                                          
44Breen, Mission Accomplished, 34 
45 Film documentary footage of interviews with Australian troops in Dili, archive number MDV-99-0041 (dated 
25/09/99), viewed by the author at the Centre Archives Max Stahl (CAMS), Dili, 3 May 2014. 
46 Breen, Mission Accomplished, 70 
47 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 127 
48 Smith & Dee, Peacekeeping, 46 
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national mechanisms by which the actions of the militias in East Timor were controlled 
by the Indonesian military, prior to the arrival of international troops. First, we outline 
the broad contest live in Indonesian politics in 1999, prior to and building from the    ǯ Ǥ nd, we outline the background to the pro-
Indonesian Timorese militias, and highlight the important links between these militia and 
the hardline elements in the central military command. Third, we highlight the impact of 
martial law on ultimately reducing the levels of violence and associated atrocities prior 
to international intervention. Finally, we consider the important international influence 
on national decision making during this concentrated and contested period in Indonesian 
politics.  
 
The Indonesian political context  
Turning to the national political context, during the year after Suharto stepped down in  ? ? ? ?ǡǯǤ
was the recently appointed President, Habibie, the nominated successor to Suharto, who ǮǯǤ These 
reformist inclinations were critical to how Habibie viewed the East Timor crisis49, 
particularly to the view that a referendum on Timorese independence would 
demonstrate commitment to democratisation. This is despite Habibie sharing the 
objection to Indonesian withdrawal which was widespread in the political and military 
elite at the time.50Indeed, Habibie believed that a democratic vote would support 
autonomy over independence, and would thus signal his reformist intent, whilst retaining 
Indonesian territorial integrity.51 
 
In this same context, General Wiranto, then Minister of Defence and Security, was also 
attempting to safeguard his long-term position. The situation in East Timor was equally 
central to this, with senior branches of the military and traditionalist politicians 
determined to retain the territory via military means, and reformists including Wiranto    ǯ ocratic gambit.52ǯ    ǡ
however, become increasingly strained through mid to late 1999. The interdependent 
relationship between the civilian and military leadership had thus far survived the post-
Suharto transition, but Habǯ      ǯ Ǥ            
ǡ ǯ  ǡ 
                                                          
49 Interview with Lambang Triyono, Universitas Gadja Mada, Yogyakarta, 12 November 2015.   
50 >ůŽǇĚ ? “ŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇŽŶĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌ ? ? ? ? 
51 Interview with Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Jakarta, 16 November 2015. 
52Ibid 
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removed himself from rǯ-Presidential candidate.53 
 
Concurrent to the decision to distance himself from Habibie, Wiranto was also vying for 
control of the military against Prabowo Subianto, the renegade former commander of the 
Indonesian Special Forces (Kopassus), and later of Kostrad.54Kopassus forces had been       ǯ   ǡ  
subsequent command from 1995-1998 saw a massive increase in recruitment amongst 
these units.55 Loyalty to Prabowo stemmed from his reputation as a special forces 
commander - particularly in East Timor - as well as his past proximity to Suharto, and 
from those pursuing explicit Islamist political agendas.56Despite moves by Prabowo to 
improve relations with Wiranto in early 1999, the divide between them hardened over 
their approaches to the East Timor crisis, with Prabowo advocating the hardline 
approach popular amongst much of the military elite. 
 
Far from confined to the political argument, amongst the means by which Prabowo 
wielded influence was through the exploitation of instability, which he orchestrated as a    ǯ    Ǥ    
within the uprisings of 1998, in which Kostrad - and other elements where loyalty to 
Prabowo was concentrated - Ǯǯ
ethnic Chinese community.57       ǯ
control of the demonstrations, and involved troops committing abuses against civilians 
far outside of the formal chain of command.58 This loyalty and willingness to work outside      ǯ 
command in August 1998, particularly within Kostrad and Kopassus.59 
 
The Timorese Militias 
 
The connection between the national political context outlined above, and the ending to 
mass violence in East Timor, comes to the fore when the background of this violence - 
and the background of the militias which perpetrated it in particular - is considered. 
Critically, whilst Wiranto was far from blameless in the mass atrocities which ensued60, 
the militias who were its main perpetrators shared a complex set of loyalties with 
                                                          
53 sŝƌŐŽĞ ? “/ŵƉƵŶŝƚǇZĞƐƵƌŐĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? 
54 Army Strategic Reserve Command  
55 Kingsbury, Power Politics, 117 
56 Ibid 180 
57 WƵƌĚĞǇ ? “sŝĐƚŝŵƐŝŶZĞĨŽƌŵĂƐŝ/ŶĚŽŶĞƐŝĂ ? ? ? ? ?
58 'ůĞĚŚŝůů ? “ŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐĨŽƌŚĂŶŐĞ ? ? ? ? 
59 ^ĐŚƵůǌĞ ? “ĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌZĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? 
60 Ibid 
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different elements of the fragmented military command. This included elements 
throughout the militia leadership with a close historical link to Kopassus, and with a high 
residual loyalty to Prabowo61. As we now demonstrate, the termination of the violence 
was therefore the result of an internal power struggle within the military - with Wiranto 
gaining control over these elements within East Timor through the imposition of martial 
law.  
 
Historically, the development and deployment of militia for military means formed part 
of the strategy by which ABRI sought to control the Timorese population. The overlap 
between the military and the militias is well documented, with the militias providing a 
partly deniable means of population control through brutal violence and intimidation, 
but under various elements of ABRI command.62 Whilst the use of militias was far from 
the sole creation of any individual, a key realisation of this was the creation of Garda Paksi 
in July 1995, a move funded and orchestrated by Prabowo.63Emerging from this Garda 
Paksi leadership was Eurico Guterres, whose Aitarak militia are amongst the suspected 
of perpetrators of one of the largest massacres of 1999.64 Guterres was selected by 
Prabowo as the leader of Garda Paksi, along with several other protégés, and his actions ǯsubordinates and colleagues within ABRI 
and Kopassus.65Prabowo was also linked to reactivation of Halilintar, which was amongst 
the first militia groups active in East Timor, and the acceleration of the training and 
arming of a number of Kopassus proxies.66 
 
The militias in East Timor active in 1999 emerged directly out of the remnants of these 
earlier groups, and were linked more closely with Kopassus than any other segment of 
the military. Indeed, the process of militia formation was deliberately accelerated in 
February 1999 with the deployment of two further Kopassus detachments,67 and 
Kopassus units deployed covertly into East Timor up to 5th September.68 The militia 
provided Kopassus a means of orchestrating violence in a manner which was overtly 
deniable, and which gave the helpful appearance of a civil conflict between Timorese 
groups.69 Prabowo, and those sections of the military which remained loyal to him in 
1999, were thus deeply and intimately connected to the main acts of violence against 
                                                          
61 tĂŶĚĞůƚ ? “WƌĂďŽǁŽ ?<ŽƉĂƐƐƵƐ ?ĂŶĚĂƐƚd/ŵŽƌ ? 
62 ZŽďŝŶƐŽŶ ? “WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐtĂƌ ? 
63^ĐŚƵůǌĞ ? “ĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌZĞĨĞƌĞŶĚƵŵƌŝƐŝƐ ? ? ? ? ? ?<ŝŶŐƐďƵƌǇ ?Power Politics, 117 
64 CAVR, Chega! 
65 sĂŶ<ůŝŶŬĞŶ ?ŽƵƌĐŚŝĞƌ ? “ƌŝŵĞƐŐĂŝŶƐƚ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? 
66 Kingsbury, Power Politics, 121 
67 Ibid 
68 sĂŶ<ůŝŶŬĞŶ ?ŽƵƌĐŚŝĞƌ ? “ƌŝŵĞƐŐĂŝŶƐƚ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ?
69 Kingsbury, Power Politics, 122 
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Timorese civilians through 1999, and to the overall development and deployment of 
militias across East Timor.  It was controlling Prabowo, and his loyalist elements, that was 
to become the priority for Wiranto in his search to control the military - and to assert his 
political dominance within the national arena.  
 
The impact of martial law 
 
The outcome of the Indonesian military power struggle throughout 1999 is a critical 
dimension for understanding the particular way that mass atrocities ended in East Timor 
in mid-September. In particular, it is vital to appreciate the concentration of loyalty to 
Prabowo amongst those militias and the Kopassus units which committed the majority of 
mass atrocities in East Timor, and were therefore the key to its ending. Far from simply 
signalling the transfer of power from Habibie to Wiranto, the key transformative act for 
reducing mass atrocity events on the ground in East Timor was the imposition of martial 
law from the 7th of September. The impact of this act has been largely dismissed 
elsewhere, but we find it was central to the ending to mass atrocities because of the 
transformations it entailed for ABRI command in East Timor, and for the relationship 
between troops and the militia.70 
 
Following the declaration of martial law, and with it the transfer of power to the military 
in Jakarta, Wiranto placed Lieutenant General Kiki Syahnakri in charge of operations in 
East Timor.71 ǯ     ǡ   
dispute with Prabowo, directly challenged ǯ    
military, and, in particular, with those troops in East Timor which had been linked with 
his command.72 With the imposition of martial law, external troops were relocated to the 
territory to replace units compromised in their attachment to the militia, and to 
Prabowo.73 Wiranto also made approaches to those orchestrating the militia violence, 
including meeting with Guterres and other senior militia figures in Dili on the 11th 
September. These actions, along a meeting in Bali on the 9th, produced the clear demand 
from the military leadership to cease all extra-military operations, and demonstrated that ǯǤ74 
 
Concurrently with the restoration of Wirantoǯ over East Timor, martial law led to 
a partial restoration of internal military order, and the return of control over troops in 
                                                          
70 >ůŽǇĚ ? “ŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇŽŶĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌ ? ? ? ? 
71 CAVR, Careers of Selected Officers, 2 
72 >ŽǁƌǇ ? “dŝŵŽƌdŝŵƵƌ ? ? ? ? 
73 DŽŽƌĞ ? “ĞĐŝĚŝŶŐ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? 
74 ƌŽƵĐŚ ? “ĂƐƚdŝŵŽƌ ? ? ? ? ?
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East Timor to central military command - replacing the territorial structures which had 
responsibility up until that point.75 This process was gradually asserted as fresh troops 
replaced those closely connected to the militia across the territory, and consisted ǲǡǳoutside of East Timor.76 
These newly assigned troops were both far more loyal to their commanders and to 
central command than those who had been under territorial command in East Timor and, 
whilst sympathetic to the militias and to integration, they were not so deeply connected 
to either, and acted under the direct orders to withdraw the militias.77 Eye- witness 
accounts indicate that, with this chain of decisions, the internal chaos evident in ABRI in 
the early days of the violence was then bought under stricter control.78 
 
The influx of new troops to East Timor, and the restoration of a degree of internal military 
order did not, however, put ABRI into a direct peacekeeping role, operating against the 
militia, but instead prioritised the protection of civilian life. Owing to the fact that ABRI 
had worked so closely with militia groups since the 1975 invasion - and had directly 
facilitated the ongoing atrocities up until their ending - Syahnakri opted instead to use 
the troops under his command to relocate the militia to West Timor without direct 
military engagement.79 The characterisation of the early days of martial law as failing to 
produce the engagement necessary to save civilian life - and one in which substantial 
violence took place - is therefore accurate80, but that assessment neglects the gradual 
impacts of the reassertion of order which came with this move. It was this reassertion of 
order - and with it control of elements within ABRI who were previously outside of ǯ- which began the retreat of militia, and from this the de-escalation 
of violence against civilians seen in the data and eyewitness accounts.   
  ǡǯ
East Timor were widely judged to have failed at the time. Indeed the perceived failures of 
the TNI were a significant driving force behind the renewed force behind international 
military intervention. This was publicly expressed following the visit of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) delegation to Dili on the 11th September and the UNSC 
debate a day later.81For these key international actors, the lack of rapid de-escalation in 
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the violence in the first few days of martial law was sufficient to demonstrate that the 
leadership had no intention of bringing the killings to an end, and that the militias were 
continuing to perform the function ABRI intended of them. This has informed the 
conventional account of the ending to violence in East Timor, as it very publicly dismissed 
the efforts of Wiranto as at best ineffective, and at worst indicative of a will to allow the 
mass killing of civilians to continue.82 
 
Whilst rightly pointing to the lack regard for civilian life in the conduct of ABRI after 
martial law was imposed, to dismiss the overall impact of this act in ending mass 
atrocities neglects three constraints on its immediate application, from the perspective 
of the military leadership. First, the ABRI operation had to manage the deeply embedded 
connection between troops and militia, which was deliberately cultivated across 24 years 
of occupation.83 This deep relationship reflected both the specific link between the 
militias and Kopassus discussed above, and the historic use of militias for extra-military 
purposes in conflicts across Indonesia since independence.84 The rapid and combative 
engagement of the still-rampaging militias by TNI was therefore very far from the agenda 
of the Indonesian command, even though doing so could have saved civilian life more 
rapidly.  
 
Second, the loyalty of ABRI troops on the ground to the leadership in Jakarta was limited, 
and key elements of those troops with the closest connection to the militia were aligned 
with figures outside of the chain of command - particularly Prabowo.85 Given the factional 
division at the level of the leadership, the ABRI operation could not therefore take effect 
until these compromised troops had been directly replaced: it was not simply a matter of 
issuing a change in orders to existing troops. Realising the significance of this situation 
does not diminish the culpability of key elites in Jakarta - including Wiranto - in the mass 
atrocities throughout 1999, but it provides a qualification on the capacity of the 
Indonesian military under his command to immediately bring the mass atrocities to an 
end once the decision to control the troops actions had been taken.  
 
Finally, partly owing to these complicating factors, Syahnakri did not fully control 
operations in East Timor until the 10th of September - only one day before the UNSC 
delegation visited Dili.86Combined with the competing loyalties of the troops on the 
ground, and their close links with the militia, these factors limited the extent to which the 
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imposition of martial law from the 7th September could have an immediate effect on 
violence against civilians, as expected by the international community. Rather, the 
impacts of martial law on the militias and ABRI were still being rolled out when the 
international community decided that the provision had failed. However, the impacts of 
martial law had been largely realised before the arrival of international troops ten days 
later. This finding adds an important nuance to the story of mass atrocities in East Timor, 
as it sheds more light on the responsibility of the Indonesian military not only for the 
atrocities but to their ending.   
 
The international influence on national decision making  
 
The final element to the puzzle of how mass atrocities ended in East Timor concerns the 
conditions under which the order for martial law came about. Far from demonstrating 
the concern for the loss of civilian life, it is our contention that the decision to implement 
martial law emerged out of a combination of economic and diplomatic pressure applied 
to the Indonesian regime. As the final element of this analysis, we briefly consider how 
the decision to implement martial law came about, despite the competing interests that 
Wiranto and Habibie had in maintaining control over the territory via military and militia 
action. 
 
The international pressure applied to East Timor as the scale of the violence became 
evident oǯǡ
with diplomatic interventions across regional and global actors towards the Indonesian 
government. These interventions included the prospect of sanctions to the flow of IMF 
and World Bank funds, which were keeping the Indonesian economy afloat in the wake 
of the Asian financial crisis87, and - with them - any hope for Habibie to retain power in 
the upcoming Presidential elections.88 Bilateral pressure included direct approaches to 
Habibie, Wiranto and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas from Australia, Portugal and the US, 
facilitated by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.89 The fact that this was extended to 
include the loss of US military cooperation and direct condemnation from Australia 
demonstrated the extent to which international conditions had changed since the 1975 
annexation and subsequent mass atrocities.90 
 
The range of international diplomatic and economic actors focused, first, on the need for 
Indonesia to contain the violence in general; second, on the need for national martial law 
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to take effect; and, finally, galvanised around the need for Indonesia to accept an 
international military force. International actors were not solely focused on the much-
analysed matter of achieving consent for international military intervention, as outlined 
in the wider literature, but instead on a whole range of actions that they wanted the 
Indonesian government to take in order to control the violence.91 Given that martial law 
was judged to have failed after the visit of the UN Security Council delegation on the 11th 
September92, the dominant interpretation of this international pressure emphasises the 
latter aspect of international involvement alone, rather than considering the full range of 
pressures for action that were extended.93 In light of the relations between Habibie and 
Wiranto, the fact that the decision to implement martial law was taken at all, that it was 
subsequently pursued on the ground, and that it produced the ultimate series of effects 
discussed in the previous section, we find this demonstrates that the first two stages of 
international pressure were significant. They had a direct effect on the Indonesian 
government taking steps to assure an end to ongoing atrocities.  
 
For Habibie, the decision to implement martial law meant acknowledging the failure of 
his bid to settle the East Timor crisis without ceding control to the military. Indeed, it 
meant that the lengths to which he had gone to resist the military solution to East Timor, 
including his willingness to damage relations with elements of the military establishment, 
had been wasted: he would now have to pass control of the situation to the military 
command.94 As discussed above, on the national Indonesian political context, ǯ
decision occurred at a time in which political relations between Habibie and Wiranto had 
already substantially deteriorated,95  and where the balance of power in Jakarta had been 
slowly edging towards the civilian over the military establishment.96 Habibie's final act of 
defiance within this delicate balance ǯ
to implement martial law, only for it to be implemented by Presidential Decree hours 
later.97 These rapid and highly volatile exchanges at the highest level of Indonesian 
national politics demonstrate just how contested policy on East Timor was at the time, 
and how much changed so rapidly.  
 
For Wiranto, despite signalling a victory over Habibie on East Timor, the decision to 
implement martial law was also driven by more than strategic interest. Given that it 
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entailed the withdrawal of ABRI, and, with them, the militias committing atrocities in the   ǡ        ǯ 
commitment to Indonesian territorial integrity by any means.98 Indeed, through his 
orders to Syahnakri that the militia be withdrawn, Wiranto was coerced into directly 
paving the way for the loss of control of the territory.99 As was reported in the media at 
the time, martial law also publicly displayed the extent to which Wiranto had lost control 
of events in East Timor, including the elements within his own military establishment.100 
This did not ultimately damage Wiranto to the extent that it did Habibie101, but the 
implementation of martial law, and the manner in which it was pursued, far from ǯǣ
indeed, it directly undermined them.   
 
Martial law, and with it the withdrawal of ABRI and the militias, thus occurred despite the 
politics interests of Habibie and Wiranto, and despite the political gulf which had 
emerged between them, and between the civilian and military establishments over East 
Timor. Whilst tracing the inner nuances of how these figures reacted to each element of 
international pressure in the first days of the violence is beyond the scope of our analysis, 
the fact that this occurred in a situation of unprecedented and mounting international 
pressure provides a convincing chain of causation. Indeed, to remain defiant or internally 
divided meant the likelihood of serious national economic decline, a direct threat to the 
military budget, a loss of regional legitimacy, and the potential for pariah status 
internationally. These are factors which neither Habibie nor Wiranto were ultimately 
able to withstand, given their respective struggles for national political influence.  
 
Concluding reflections 
Our analysis of the dynamics of violence and political leadership, at the end of the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timor in 1999, has provided new insights into the causality ǤǮǯ
of ending by international military intervention, we have determined two key revisions 
to that argument. First, we found that mass atrocities ended before the international 
military intervention took place, with the death rate falling dramatically in the days 
preceding the arrival of international troops. Second, we have presented an alternative 
thesis to the ending to mass civilian killings in this case, arguing that it was the crucial 
decisions made within the Indonesian political and military elite that directly ended the 
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violence. 
Rather than a humanitarian response to the human toll of violence, the decision to 
implement martial law, and the (very) brief alignment between civilian and military 
leadership in Jakarta over this decision, had been produced by mounting international 
economic and diplomatic pressure, which quickly followed the height of the violence. 
Hence, whilst the evidence we have presented here leads us to reject the conventional 
account of how international military intervention ended mass atrocities in East Timor, 
this does not mean we conclude that the international cǯ  
irrelevant in enabling an ending to atrocities in this case. This has been demonstrated 
through our analysis of the interests of key figures within the Indonesian establishment, 
in an environment of intense and mounting international diplomatic and military 
pressure. The question of how much, and which kind, of international pressure had the 
greatest effect on the national decision making process would merit further research into 
the inner nuances of the relations between these leading political figures at the time.  
 
Further, our reframing of the East Timorcase should not be seen as an argument against 
the significance of international action to enable endings to mass atrocities, and in no way 
questions the total culpability of the Indonesian administration for the atrocities of 1999. 
Our approach also does not dismiss the wider role of international military intervention 
in East Timor, such as creating the conditions for delivering humanitarian aid. Rather, our 
findings challenge the conventional framing of this case of as one of successful 
international military intervention to end mass atrocities. We also challenge the casting of ǲǳǡǡ
argued by Wheeler & Dunne.102 Instead, we find it was a highly contested state, the 
internal political dynamics of which were key to the nature of, and final ending to, the 
atrocities of 1999, through the eventual imposition of martial law.  
In addition to reframing the existing empirical knowledge of the East Timor case, our 
analysis has contributed to the development of a broader methodological and analytical 
approach to understanding the role of effective humanitarian interventions. By 
examining the same set of events from a range of data perspectives, we have been able to 
process-trace the relevant decisions and actions at the national and sub-national level 
that contributed directly to mass atrocity ending. Much as the local turn in peacebuilding 
scholarship has highlighted the critical role of local actors in constructing how Ǯǯǡ 
atrocity ending has provided a deeper insight into the decisions that caused its end in this 
case. We have not found elsewhere a similar attempt to map and measure the impact of 
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international military interventions on endings to mass atrocities using mixed data 
sources. We find that taking such an approach has added both new theoretical and 
empirical insights to the analysis of mass atrocity endings, and we hope to develop it 
further in future comparative research. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4/9: Announcement of Ballot Result ʹ Favouring Independence 
30/8: Independence Ballot Takes Place  
11/9: UNSC Delegation Visit Dili 
7/9: Martial Law Implemented 
20/9: First INTERFET Troops Arrive in Dili 
21/10: INTERFET Reach All Areas 
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Figure 4 
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Table 1 
 
Table 1: Civilian killings where the Precise Date is Unknown 
Type Reported Killings 
Precise date unknown, range of dates provided 25 
5 
1 
5 
2 
12 
8th Ȃ 10th 
10th Ȃ 11th 
10th Ȃ 13th 
21st Ȃ 22nd 
22nd Ȃ 28th 
September 
Precise date unknown, month provided 
September 
October 
20 
15 
5 
Precise date unknown, no additional information 5 
Total 50 
 
 
